Moral dilemma judgment has been extensively studied by neurosciences and much is now known about the cerebral dynamics supporting this kind of reasoning. Neuroeconomics has provided some interesting hypothesis for modeling decision making. The present paper aims to test if dilemma judgment may be formalized by this kind of modeling. In addition, fMRI and electroencephalographic (EEG) studies have shown that dilemma judgment involves benefit and risk analysis supported by specific neural systems. Because of this, the EEG was recorded while volunteers were judging moral dilemma in order to provide additional information to test the proposed hypothesis. Present experimental and simulated results seem to validate the theoretical model described in this paper. EEG results shows that dilemma solution requires a complex enrollment of neurons in different parts of the brain in order to assess the benefits and risks of proposed solutions. Finally, the probability of each possible dilemma solution is shown to be adequately calculated from the proposed model.
Introduction
Classic decision theory asserts that decision makers ought to choose the option that offers the highest expected value (EV) Expected Utility Theory (EUT) gained greater currency among economists when von Neumann and Morgenster (1953) articulated a set of axioms that are assumed to be necessary and sufficient to allow one to represent preferences by EV maximization. Among such axioms, the "sure-thing principle" proposes: If two acts yield the same consequence when a particular state is achieved, then a person's preference among those acts should not depend on the particular consequence that they have in common. The sure-thing principle is necessary to establish that utilities of outcomes are weighted by their respective probabilities (e.g., Trepel et al, 2005) .
Although EUT is widely accepted, it has been challenged by many experimental studies disclosing many different violations of its proposals. The most powerful challenge has come to be known as the ¨Allais Paradox¨ (e.g., Trepel et al, 2005) . Prospect theory (PT) was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) to accommodate these discrepant experimental results. These authors proposed that the value ( ) p x V , of a prospect that pays x with probability p is given by ( ) ( ) ( )
where ( ) Neurosciences, however, have begun to investigate the cerebral circuits involved in calculating the expected rewards and risks associated with a decisionmaking (e.g., Fellow and Farah, 2005; Knutson et al, 2003 Knutson et al, ,2007 Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; McClure et al, 2001; Preuschoff, Bossaerts and Quartz, 2006; Tobler et al, 2007) . In this context (Rocha et al, 2009; Rocha, 2013bc,) Temporally, the activation related to expected reward was immediate, while the activation related to risk was delayed. In addition, Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) showed that nucleus accumbens activation preceded risky choices as well as riskseeking mistakes, while anterior insula activation preceded risk-less choices as well as risk-aversion mistakes. These findings suggest, according to the authors, that distinct neural circuits linked to anticipatory affect promote different types of financial choices and indicate that excessive activation of these circuits may lead to investing mistakes.
Social behavior is the hallmark of human kind. Theory of Mind (ToM) as the ability to attribute mental states to others (Frith and Frith, 2003) has an important role in social cognition. Brain imaging studies in healthy subjects have described a brain system involving medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus and temporal pole in ToM processing (e.g., Gallagher et al 2002; Hamilton, et al 2006;  den Ouden et al2005). In addition, Fiddick, Spampinato and Grafman (2005) showed that, although the tested social and non-social rules were matched in terms of their logical structure, reasoning about social contracts and precautions (non-social rules) activated a different constellation of neurological structures.
The actual knowledge provided by neurosciences allows the following definition of the dimensions of PES and IES (Rocha et al, 2009; Rocha, 2013b,c) :
Rewarding system: it corresponds to the Liking System proposed by Berridge, 2003 and it is in charge to evaluate the expected benefit
2) Risk taking system: it corresponds to the Fear-Panic system as described e.g.
by Graef, 2003 and Ledoux, 1996 , and it is in charge of assessing the estimated cost Moral judgment in case of social dillemma (Greene et al 2001 (Greene et al ,2004 Rocha et al, 2013a) , is an example of this type of hard decision-making. Let be their examples:
The trolley dilemma: ( 1 P ) A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds in its present course. ( 2 P ) The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. ( Q ) Is it appropriate to switch tracks?
The foot bridge dilemma: ( 1 P ) As before, the trolley will kill five people ( 2 P ) unless you push a stranger to be killed and stop the trolley in order to save the five other people. ( Q ) Is it appropriate to push the stranger?
Such dilemmas have the following structure (Rocha et al, 2013a) : The trolley dilemma is proposed to be an impersonal dilemma (ID) because bridge dilemma is classified as a personal dilemma (PD) because 2 P action must be "authored" by the decision maker. PD is proposed to involve personal moral violations that make decision a hard task (Greene et al 2001 (Greene et al , 2004 The personal risk for switching tracks is certainly smaller than that of pushing a stranger from the footbridge. The main hypothesis of the present paper is to assume that the neuroeconomic decision making model proposed by Rocha et al (2009; 2013b,c) provides an adequate formalization of dilemma judgment.
Rocha et al (Foz et al, 2001; Pereira Jr. 2004; Rocha et al, 2013a) Contrary to fMRI, EEG mapping has a high temporal resolution that allows a better characterization of cerebral dynamics associated with dilemma judgment (Rocha et al, 2013a) . Because of this, EEG is used here to provide further information to test the proposed model for dilemma judgment.
In the present paper, we assumed that:
1) decision making in moral judgment of those dilemma is formalized by means of the model described in the next section;
2) the comparison of experimental and simulated results is used to check the validity of our model and 3) the entropy ) ( 1 c h measures how much the EEG activity is related with the decision making in moral judgment and that its analysis contributes to test the hypothesis introduced here.
The Model
Following Rocha et al (2009) Also, because reward and risk involve different evaluations (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1991; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Preuschoff, Bossaerts and Quartz, 2006; Tversky and Kanheman, 1992) it is proposed here that ( ) function has an inflection point marking the transition from a predominantly limbic to a predominantly cortical risk evaluation.
As discussed above, reasoning about social contracts and non-social rules activated different neural circuits (e.g., Britton et al, 2006; Fiddick, Spampinato and Grafman, 2005 
Fairness has been associated with activity at left amygdala, bilateral insula, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulkus, and reward-related areas (e.g., Sanfey et al, 2003; Singer et al, 2004 Greene et al 2001 Greene et al ,2004 Moll et al, 2005) and is calculated as:
The dificulty of decision increases as conflict augments (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen and Carter 2004; Greene et al 2001 Greene et al ,2004 
where ω i (i=0,2) are constants. In 
The activity in the inferior frontal cortex and parietal areas have being correlated with desirability or stimulus salience and the decision about probabilistic choices (e.g., Dorris and Glimcher, 2004 , Glimcher, 2003 and Huettel, Song and McCarthy, 2005 
and
2. Methods
EEG measurements
10 female and 10 male adults (mean age 27y 3 mo) volunteered for solving 30 dilemmas previously used by Greene et al (2204) while his/her EEG was registered with 20 electrodes placed according to the 10/20 system; impedance smaller than 10 Kohm ; notch filter 50Hz; sampling rate of 256 Hz and 10 bits resolution. The dilemmas were translated to Portuguese by one of the authors, having a degree on Linguistics.
Two networked personal computer were used: one for the EEG recording and the other for sequentially displaying 1 P , 2 P and Q. The volunteers were allowed to take as much time as need to read 1 P , 2 P and Q and to decide about 2 P as being adequate or not adequate as the dilemma solution (S 
Simulations
Simulations were performed by calculating equations 1 to 11 with time step of 1 second, during 20 seconds, using the parameters as in 
Results

Experimental and Theoretical Data
Despite the fact that the mean ST was statistically the same for both ID and PD, the maximum ST was greater for PD than for ID (Fig. 1C) The experimental ST dynamics was used to set parameters k 1 ,k 2 ,k 3 and ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ (table 1) P in the case of ID was greater than that for PD, whereas the compliance ) ( 2 P t ξ of 2 P in the case of ID was smaller than that for PD (Figure1B). The consequences were that theoretically
for both ID and PD, and that ) P p( 2 _ obtained for PD was greater than that calculated for ID. As a matter of fact the theoretical and experimental values of ) p(P 2 and ) P p( 2 _ were similar for both types of dilemma. 
Brain Mappings
Logistic regression was used to study a possible correlation between dilemma judgment and the EEG activity recorded during the Q epoch (see methods: t s -t q ), when the volunteer was deciding in considering 2 P adequate (D=1) or inadequate (D=0) dilemma solution. 
It is noteworthy to observe that the EEG activity recorded at the left hemisphere mostly contributed for considering 2 P adequate (
) in the case of ID whereas the right posterior brain was more involved in considering 2 P 
in the PD case is also dependent on the same anterior areas influencing ID decision in both hemisphere, besides depending on CZ and PZ but not on P3 and O1. 2 P innadequacy ( 0 → D ) in case of PD is associated with electrodes FP2, FZ, C3, P4 and T6. In Figure 2 , the mappings labelled PD-ID were calculated for It is noteworthy to observe that practically the same areas contributed to decrease (rose/red electrodes in Figure 3 ) or to increase (green/blue electrodes in Figure 3 ) in the case of both ID and PD. Also, the comparison of Figures 2 and 3, shows that the electrodes influencing the actual value of ST are also involved in deciding about 2 P being adequate or not. The PD-ID mapping, however, shows that most of the electrodes contributed to increase ST if PD is compared to ID.
Discussion
The experimental and theoretical data
The experimental and simulated results presented here validate the theoretical model described by eqs. 1 to 11 and they support the model as an adequate tool to formalized decision-making in the case of dilemma judgment. Greene et al (2002 Greene et al ( , 2004 , that the amount of PD personal moral violation is greater than that of ID.
Our definition of conflict resulted in
. In our formulation, high conflict reduces decision time. This is in accordance with the fact that St max is greater in PD than in ID, for both theoretical (figure 1B) and experimental ( figure 1C ) data, but it disagrees with Greene's et al (2002 Greene's et al ( ,2004 proposal that conflict is associated with the difficulty imposed by personal moral violation in the case of PD and so it increases ST. The increased ACC activity disclosed by those authors associated with difficult PD decisions is explained here by the increase of 
EEG recording
Despite the claims about the EEG spatial discrimination limitations, the patterns of brain activity we recorded may be imputed to the enrollment of a large number of neurons widely distributed in the brain in the task of dilemma solving. This is because both the logistic ( ) ( ... proposed by other authors (Berthoz et al, 2006; Greene et al, 2002 Greene et al, , 2004 Figure 2 -ID and PD. These propositions may also be in agreement with Greene et al (2002 Greene et al ( , 2004 who found that areas BA 9/10 (medial frontal girus), BA 31 (posterior cingulated gyrus) and BA 39 (angular gyrus) are more active in PD judgment than in ID decision. In addition, these authors showed that BA 46 (middle frontal gyrus, bilateral) and BA 7/40 (parietal lobe, bilateral) are less active in PD than in ID judgment.
The left hemisphere seems to contribute for ) P p( 2 _ more in the case of PD than in the case of ID, whereas the left hemisphere seems to influence both ) p(P 2 in the same way (Figure 2, PD-ID Such propositions are supported by the literature showing that the left brain is much more involved in the cognition about the self and the right hemisphere is much more related with the social cognition (Berthoz et al, 2006; Brady et al, 2004; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004; Fiddick et al, 2005; Greene et al, 2002 Greene et al, , 2004 Frith and Frith, 2003; Hamilton et al, 2006; Moll et al, 2001 Moll et al, , 2003 Quervain et al, 2004) ST distribution was very similar PD and ID, the main differences being quantitative rather than qualitative. In addition, the PD-ID mapping in figure 3 shows that PD decision is most delayed by the right hemisphere and FP7
electrodes. This indicates a very complex neural processing of dilemma judgment, similar to that disclosed by Greene et al (2002 Greene et al ( , 2004 .
Conclusion
Glimcher (2003) questions the classical Cartesian-Sherringtonian approach of neurosciences:
1) identify a simple behavior;
2) determine a priori the minimal set of neurobiological components that could account for that behavior;
3) look for evidence that those components exist, and 4) localize them.
The fundamental inadequacy of such an approach is the failure to get the real understanding of any complex system in handling complex tasks, like the brain in complex decision-making. Neuroeconomics modeling is an important step in this direction, because it deals with the dynamics of the complex interactions between a large number of widely distributed neurons that enroll to solve a complex task, instead of just the identifying and localizing of some of these neurons. The present results disclose a complex association of the EEG activity recorded by widely distributed electrodes that support a probabilistic model of decision-making.
Glimcher's thesis requires probability theory to be incorporate into the approaches used to understand the brain.
Although neuroeconomics is in its early stages, and much have to be done to make its models about decision-making broadly predictive as well as explanatory, we believe that the present paper represents an important contribution in that direction.
